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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
THE 1986-1987 TERM (PART I) 
Paul C. Giannelli OCT 2 11987 
Albert J. ·Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law and Criminal Justice 
Case Wester,·; Reserve University 
The 1986-1987 Term of the United States Supreme 
Court ended in June. This is the first of two articles 
reviewing the major decisions involving criminal proce-
dure decided this Term. 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
Curtilage 
United States v. Dunn, 107 S.Ct. 1134 (1987), presented 
the Court with the opportunity to examine the "curtilage" 
rule. An investigation led D.E.A. agents to believe that 
Dunn was manufacturing phenylacetone and ampheta-
mine on his ranch. Traversing several fences, agents 
entered his property and peered into a barn where they 
discovered a laboratory. Based on this information, the 
agents obtained a warrant, arrested Dunn, and seized 
chemicals and equipment. The barn was located approx-
imately 50 yards from a fence that encircled the resi-
dence. Dunn challenged the initial warrantless entry onto 
his property, and a federal appellate court held that the 
barn was within the curtilage and thus subject to Fourth 
Amendment protection. 
The Supreme Court reversed. In earlier cases, the 
Court had held that the Fourth Amendment did not 
protect "open fields." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 
170 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
The Amendment's protection, however, did encompass 
the residence and curtilage- the area immediately 
surrounding the dwelling house. In Dunn the Court identi-
fied four factors which defined the curtilage: 
the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the 
home, whether the area is included within an 
enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the 
uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by 
the resident to protect the area from observation by 
people passing by. 107 S.Ct. at 1139. 
Applying these factors, the Court concluded that the 
barn did not fall within the curtilage. It was located 50 
yards from the house, was not within the residence 
fence, was not used for the intimate activities of the 
home, and the traversed fences were designed to corral 
livestock, not to prevent observation. . 
ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
The Court also ruled that while Dunn had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the barn, he had no such expec-
tation in the open fields from which the agents peered into 
the barn. To support its position, the Court quoted from 
Oliver: 
[T]he term "open fields" may include any unoccupied 
or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. An open 
field need be neither "open" nor a "field" as those terms 
are used in common speech. 466 U.S. at 180 n.11. 
Since the agents did not enter the barn, but stood in an 
open field to observe into the barn, there was no search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
Searches of Government Employees 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987), involved a 
search of a state hospital employee's office by hospital 
officials who were investigating alleged improprieties. 
The employee, Dr. Ortega, instituted a § 1983 suit 
challenging the search. A plurality of the Court reached 
several conclusions. First, public employees may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work. 
Because of the great variety of work environments in the 
public sector, however, this expectation of privacy must 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In this case, Dr. 
Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
desk and file cabinets because he did not share them 
with other employees. Second, neither a warrant nor 
probable cause is required in this context: 
We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on 
the constitutionally protected privacy interests of gov-
ernment employees for noninvestigatory, work-related 
purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related 
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of rea-
sonableness under all the circumstances. !d. at 1502. 
The case was then remanded to the District Court to de-
termine whether the search in question satisfied the stan-
dard of reasonableness, both in its inception and scope. 
The deciding vote was cast by Justice Scalia, who 
wrote a concurring opinion. He objected to the plurality 
opinion on several grounds. The case-by-case approach 
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adopted by the plurality is "so devoid of content that it 
produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field." 
/d. at :1505. Instead of this approach, Justice Scalia would 
hold that offices of government employees, including 
drawers and files within those offices, are covered by the 
Fourth Amendment as a general matter. In addition, how-
ever, he believed that searches to retrieve work-related 
materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules 
are reasonable and thus do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Particularity Requirement 
In M'aryland v. Garrison, 107 S.Ct. 1013 (1987), the 
police obtained a warrant to search Lawrence McWebb 
and the "premises known as 2036 Park Avenue third 
floor." When the police applied for the warrant and when 
they executed it, they reasonably believed that only one 
apartment was on the third floor. In fact, there were two 
apartments- one occupied by McWebb and the other 
by Garrison, the defendant. Before the police realized 
that there were separate apartments, they discovered 
heroin in Garrison's apartment. He challenged the 
search as unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court rejected this challenge. According 
to the Court, the case raised two issues-the validity of 
the warrant and the reasonableness of its execution. The 
Fourth Amendment explicitly prohibits the issuance of a 
warrant except one "particularly describing the place to 
be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 
This "requirement ensures that the search will be care-
fully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the 
character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the 
Framersintended to prohibit." /d. at 1017. If the police 
had known or should have known that there were sepa-
rate apartm~nts, the warrantwould have been defective. 
The constitutionality of their conduct, however, must be 
judged in light of the information available at the time 
they sought the warrant. Under this standard, their 
conduct was constitutional. 
The execution of the warrant presented a different is-
sue. Here, again, the Court found the police's conduct 
reasonable under the facts. Nevertheless, the Court 
remarked: 
If the officers had known, or should have known, that 
the third floor contained two apartments before they 
entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus 
had been aware of the error in the warrant, they would 
have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb's 
apartment. Moreover, as the officers recognized, they 
were required to discontinue the search of respon-
dent's apartment as soon as they discovered that there 
were two separate units on the third floor. . . /d. at 1018. 
Automobile Inventory Seaiches 
In Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987), the police 
arrested the defendant for driving while intoxicated. 
Before a tow truck arrived to take Bertine's van to an 
impoundment lot, a backup officer inventoried its 
contents in accordance with local police procedures. The 
officer found drugs and cash in a closed backpack. 
Bertine argued that the search of the backpack violated 
the Fourth Amendment. 
In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the 
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Court had held that inventory searches of automobiles 
were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. See also 
Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983) (upholding an 
inventory search of personal effects of an arrestee at the 
police station). Opperman, however, did not involve the 
opening of a closed container. Moreover, in other cases 
the Court had held that searches of closed containers 
generally required a warrant. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 
442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 
1 (1977). These cases led the Colorado Supreme Court to 
rule that the drugs should have been suppressed. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Accord-
ing to tile Court, inventory searches differ from law en-
forcement searches, which are intended to enforce penal 
laws. In contrast, inventory searches "serve to protect an 
owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to 
insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized prop-
erty, and to guard the police from danger." 107 S.Ct. at 
741. These governmental interests outweigh the individu-
al's interest in privacy and apply to closed containers. In 
addition, "there was no showing that the police, who 
were following standardized procedures, acted in bad 
faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." /d. at 742. 
The Court found it irrelevant that the van could have 
been parked and locked at the scene or that Bertine was 
not afforded an opportunity to make alternative arrange-
ments for the safekeeping of his property. 
Plain View Seizures 
Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S.Ct. 1149 (1987), involved the 
application of the plain view doctrine. A bullet fired 
through the floor of Hicks' apartment struck a man in the 
apartment below. The police entered Hicks' apartment 
looking for the shooter and for weapons. They seized a 
number of weapons. During the course of this search, an 
officer noticed two sets of expensive stereo components, 
which seemed out of place in the squalid apartment. 
Suspecting that they were stolen, he moved some com-
ponents to read the serial numbers. After learning that 
they had been taken in a robbery, he seized them. 
Although the validity of the initial entry was conceded 
due to exigent circumstances created by the shooting, 
Hicks challenged the seizure of the stereo components. 
On review, the Supreme Court agreed with Hicks' posi-
tion. According to the Court, moving the equipment 
constituted a separate search: "But taking action, un-
related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, 
which exposed to view concealed portions of the apart-
ment or its contents, did produce a new invasion of 
respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circum-
stances that validated the entry." /d. at 1152. The Court 
found the officer's conduct "much more than trivial." "A 
search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing 
but the bottom of a turntable." /d. at 1153. 
The Court next considered whether this search could 
be justified under the plain view doctrine. "It is w&ll es-
tablished that under certain circumstances the police 
may seize evidence in plain view without a warrant." 
Coolidge v. New Hamsphire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). 
The issue in Hicks was whether such a seizure could be 
based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable 
cause. The Court held that the higher probable cause 
standard applied. It reached this conclusion by consider-
ing the underlying purpose of the plain view rule. That 
rule permits a warrantless seizure. Thus, only the warrant 
requirement is waived, not the quantum of proof needed 
~, to justify the seizure: d f t . ld rt 
" Dispensing with the nee or a warran IS wor s apa 
from permitting a lesser standard of cause for the 
seizure than a warrant would require, i.e., the standard 
of probable cause. /d. at 1153-54. -
Administrative Searches 
New York v. Burger, 107 S.Ct. 2636 (1987), involved a 
warrantless search of an automobile junkyard. Police 
officers from the Auto Crimes Division entered Burger's 
junkyard to conduct an inspection pursuant to a New 
York statute. After checking Vehicle Identification Num-
bers, they determined that several stolen cars were in the 
yard. Burger was charged with possession of stolen 
property and challenged the inspection on Fourth 
Amendment grounds. The New York Court of Appeals 
agreed with Burger, because the searches were under-
taken for law enforcement, not regulatory, purposes. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court long had 
recognized the applicability of the Fou~h Ame~dment to 
administrative inspections of commercial prem1ses for 
the purposes of enforcing regulatory statutes. See v. City 
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). The Court, however, also 
had recognized a special rule for pervasively regulated 
industries. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
Because the owner or operator of commercial pre-
mises in a "closely regulated" industry has a reduced 
expectation of privacy, the warrant and probable-cause 
requirements ... have lessened application in _this c?n-
text. Rather, we conclude that ... where the pnvacy In-
terests of the owner are weakened and the government 
interests in regulating particular businesses are con-
comitantly heightened, a warrantless inspection of 
commercial premises may well be reasonable within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 107 S.Ct. at 
2643. 
Statutory schemes fall within this exception if they advise 
owners that the search is being conducted pursuant to 
the law, the search is limited in scope, and the discretion 
of those conducting the search is circumscribed. The 
Court concluded that the statute satisfied this criteria. 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the statutory scheme was designed to enforce 
penal laws. Rather, the Court found the statute to be 
intended principally to further administrative purposes. 
"Nor do we think that this administrative scheme is 
unconstitutional simply because, in the course of enforc-
ing it, an inspecting officer may discover evidence of 
crimes, besides violations of the scheme itself:' /d. at 
2651. Finally, the Court found no constitutional signi- . 
ficance in the fact that the statute was enforced by pollee 
officers rather than "administrative" agents. 
Probation Searches 
Joseph Griffin, who was on probation, had his home 
searched by probation officers. They had no warrant. A 
gun was found, and Griffin was convicted of a weapons 
violation. These facts became the subject of the Court's 
decision in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S.Ct. 3164 (1987). 
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The Supreme Court upheld the search "because it 
was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself satis-
fies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness require-
ment under well established principles." /d. 3167. The 
Court found a "special need" for probation supervision, 
which permitted "a degree of impingement upon privacy 
that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at 
large." /d. at 3168. This special need justified dispensing 
with the warrant requirement, which the Court found to 
be "impracticable" in this context: 
A warrant requirement would interfere to an apprecia-
ble degree with the probation system, setting up a 
magistrate rather than the probation officer as the 
judge of how close a supervis~on the p~obatio~~r 
requires. Moreover, the delay mherent m obtammg a 
warrant would make it more difficult for probation offi-
cials to respond quickly to evidence of misconduct ... 
and would reduce the deterrent effect that the possibil-
ity of expeditious searches would otherwise create ... 
/d. at 3169. 
Similarly, the Court believed that the application of the: 
probable cause requirement would undermine probation 
supervision. Instead, such searches are permissible if 
the information indicates "only the likelihood ('had or 
might have guns') of facts justifying the search." /d. at 
3171. 
Good Faith Exception 
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was 
first announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1984). In Leon the Court ruled that the exclusionary rule 
did not apply to evidence obtained by police officers who 
acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon a search 
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate, even when the 
warrant was later found to be unsupported by probable 
cause. Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987), involved the 
extension of Leon to a search pursuant to a statute 
authorizing warrantless administrative searches, which 
was later declared unconstitutional. 
The defendants operated an automobile wrecking 
yard, which was subject to periodic inspections pursuant 
to a state statute. During one inspection, the police 
seized several cars which had been stolen, and the 
defendants were charged with violating several motor 
vehicle statutes. The day after the search, a federal court 
in an unrelated case ruled the statute unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court found the good faith exception 
applicable: 
The approach used in Leon is equally applicable to the 
present case. The application of the exclusionary rule 
to suppress evidence obtained by an officer acting in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a statute would 
have as little deterrent effect on the officer's actions as 
would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant. Unless a 
statute is clearly unconstitutional, an officer cannot be 
expected to question the judgment of the legislature 
that passed the law. If the statute is subsequently 
declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence 
obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial declara-
tion will not deter future Fourth Amendment violations 
by an officer who has simply fulfilled his responsibility 
to enforce the statute as written./d. at 1167. 
Applying this reasoning to the facts, the Court concluded 
that the police reliance on the statute was objectively 
reasonable. 
CONFESSIONS 
Voluntariness - Governmental Involvement 
The defendant in Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S.Ct. 515 
(1986), approached a policeman and stated that he had 
murdered someone and wanted to talk about it. The offi-
cer advised Connelly of his Miranda rights. After the 
arrival of a homicide detective, Connelly again received 
Miranda warnings, after which he stated that he had 
killed Mary Ann Junta during November 1982. He subse-
quently led the police to the location of the crime. The 
next morning Connally became visibly disoriented during 
an interview with a public defender. He stated that 
"voices" had told him to confess. He was sent to a state 
hospital for a mental evaluation. Although he was initially 
found incompetent to stand trial, later evaluations con-
cluded that he was competent. 
At trial Connelly filed a motion to suppress. A state 
psychiatrist testified that he was suffering from chronic 
schizophrenia at least as of the day before his confes-
sion. He told the psychiatrist that he was following the 
"voice of God." According to the psychiatrist, Connelly 
was experiencing "command hallucinations," which in-
terfered with his volitional abilities- his ability to make 
free and rational choices. His cognitive abilities, however, 
were not significantly impaired; that is, he understood his 
right to remain silent. The trial court suppressed the 
statements, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed. 
The court found that the confession was not the product 
of Connelly's free will, and thus was involuntary under 
the Due Process Clause, even though the police had 
done nothing wrong or coercive in securing the confes-
sion. The court also found that his mental condition pre-
cluded him from waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court first 
addressed the Due Process issue. Under this analysis, 
"certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation or as 
applied to the unique characteristics of a particular sus-
pect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that 
they must be condemned." Miller v. Fenton, 106 S.Ct. 
445, 449 (1985). Nevertheless, the Court's consideration 
of involuntary confessions under the Due Process 
Clause has "focused upon the crucial element of police 
overreaching." 107 S.Ct. at 520. For example, in Black-
burn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), the defendant was 
"probably insane at the time of his confession." Yet, the 
crucial aspect of the case was that the police knew this 
and "exploited this weakness with coercive tactics." 107 
S.Ct. at 521. The Court wrote: "The most outrageous 
behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence 
against a defendant does not make that evidence inad-
missible under the Due Process Clause." /d. Accordingly, 
"coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the 
finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within the 
meaning of the Due Process Clause .. . "/d. at 522. 
The Court next addressed the Miranda issues. The 
Colorado Supreme Court had held that the prosecution 
must establish a waiver of Miranda rights by "clear and 
convincing evidence." The U.S. Supreme Court found 
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this.s.tandard to be inconsistent with Lego v. Twomey, 404 
U.S. 477 (1972), which required the prosecution to estab-
lish the voluntariness of a confession by only a prepon-
derance of evidence. 
We now reaffirm our holding in Lego: Whenever the ~-
State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress 
a statement that the defendant claims was obtained in 
violation of our Miranda doctrine, the State need prove 
waiver by only a preponderance of evidence. 107 S.Ct. 
at523. 
Analyzing Connelly's waiver, the Court found his 
perception of coercion stemming from the "voice of 
God''-n·relevant:tike'the Due Process issue, the privi-
lege against compelled self-incrimination requires 
governmental involvement: "The sole concern of the 
Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is 
governmental coercion." /d. at 523. 
Miranda - Interrogation 
Arizona v. Mauro, 107 S.Ct. 1931 (1987), involved the 
meaning of "interrogation" under Miranda. Responding 
to a telephone call from a store, the police arrived at the 
scene, at which time Mauro said that he had killed his 
son. He directed the police to the body, was arrested, 
and advised of his Miranda rights. He was again read his 
rights at the police station, but at this point he requested 
an attorney. Mauro's wife then requested to speak with 
him. The police granted the request on the condition that 
an officer be present. The officer placed a tape recording 
machine in plain sight. Mauro told his wife not to answer 
questions until a lawyer was present. At trial Mauro raised , 
an insanity defense. In rebuttal the prosecution played ~ 
the taped interview between Mauro and his wife, arguing 
that it demonstrated his sanity on the day of the killing. 
fv1al1r:o_ sought to suppress the tape recording on the 
grouliostHafffconsfiti.ited interrogation under Miranda. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected Mauro's argu-
ment. Miranda is triggered only by custodial interroga-
tion. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the 
Court had ruled that the Miranda safeguards extended 
not only to express questioning but also to its "functional 
equivalent," which the Court defined as "any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those normal-
ly attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should 
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from the suspect." /d. at 301. During the conver-
sation with his wife, the police asked no questions. More-
over, their conduct did not amount to the type of psycho-
logical ploy that would be the functional equivalent of 
questioning. The police did not send her to speak with 
her husband. Indeed, they attempted to discourage her, 
and only relented when she insisted. 
Miranda- Warnings 
Colorado v. Spring, 107 S.Ct. 851 (1987), presented the 
question whether a suspect's awareness of all the crimes 
about which he may be questioned is relevant to deter-
mining the validity of his decision to waive the Fifth 
Amendment. An informant told agents of the Bureau of fi 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) that Spring was · 
involved with the interstate transportation of firearms. He 
also mentioned that Spring participated in the killing of 
John Walker. At the time, Walker's body had not been 
found, and the police had received no report of his disap-
pearance. The ATF agents arrested Spring after an 
undercover purchase of firearms. They read him Miranda 
warnings on two occasions, and he signed a written 
waiver. After questioning him about firearms transac-
tions, the agents asked whether Spring had ever shot 
anyone. He mumbled, "I shot another guy once." Several 
months later state police officers questioned him about 
the homicide. He waived his rights and confessed. 
Spring argued that his first statement was invalid be-
cause he was not informed that he would be questioned 
about the murder. The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment: "Spring's argument strains the meaning of com-
pulsion beyond the breaking point." /d. at857. The 
validity of a waiver has two aspects. First, the relinquish-
ment of the right must be voluntary, i.e., not the result of 
intimidation, coercion, or deception. The trial court found 
no evidence of coercion. Second, the waiver must be 
made with a full awareness of both .the nature of the right 
being abandoned and the consequences of that deci-
sion. Here, the Court found that Spring understood that 
he could remain silent and that anything he said could be 
used against him. This was all that was required: "The 
Constitution does not require that a criminal suspect 
know and understand every possible consequence of a 
waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege." /d. 
The Court also rejected an alternative argument 
offered by Spring- that failure to inform him about the 
homicide constituted police trickery. The Court wrote: 
"Once Miranda warnings are given, it is difficult to see 
how official silence could cause a suspect to misunder-
stand the nature of his constitutional right- 'his right to 
refuse to answer any question which might incriminate 
him."' /d. at 858-59 (quoting United States v. Washington, 
431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977)). 
Miranda- Waiver 
After his arrest for sexual assault, William Barrett was 
read the Miranda warnings. He signed and dated an 
acknowledgment that he had been warned of his 
constitutional rights. He then stated that "he would not 
give the police any written statements but he had no 
problem in talking about the incident." Connecticut v. 
Barrett, 107 S.Ct. 828, 830 (1987). Thirty minutes later he 
again stated that he would not give a written statement 
without his attorney but had "no problem" talking about 
the incident. He then orally admitted his involvement in 
the crime. The Connecticut Supreme Court held that 
Barrett had invoked his right to counsel by refusing to 
make written statements without the presence of his 
attorney. 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Accord-
ing to the Court, the police could not have obtained a 
written statement from Barratt once he had invoked his 
right to counsel. His assertion of the right to counsel, 
however, involved only written statements: 
Barrett's limited requests for counsel ... were accom-
panied by affirmative announcements of his willing-
ness to speak with the authorities. The fact that 
officials took the opportunity provided by Barrett to 
obtain an oral confession is quite consistent with the 
Fifth Amendment. Miranda gives the defendant a right 
to choose between speech and silence, and Barrett 
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chose to speak. /d. at 832. 
Nor did the Court believe that his limited request for 
counsel evidenced a failure to understand the conse-
quences of his waiver, because Barrett had testified that 
he understood his Miranda rights. 
Impeachment by Silence 
Greer v. Miller, 107 S.Ct. 3102 (1987), involved the 
impeachment of a defendant with his postarrest silence. 
Miller was charged with kidnapping, robbery, and 
murder. At trial he testified in his own defense, denying 
any direct involvement in the crimes. The prosecutor 
began his cross-examination as follows: 
Q: Mr. Miller, how old are you? 
A:23. 
Q: Why didn't you tell this story to anybody when you 
got arrested? 
The defense counsel objected and asked for a mistrial. 
The trial court sustained the objection and instructed the 
jury to ignore the question "for the time being." The pro-
secutor did not pursue this line of questioning, nor did he 
mention it in closing argument. Miller was convicted. In a 
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, a federal court 
of appeals ruled that the prosecutor's conduct required 
reversal. 
The Supreme Court disagreed. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held that "the use for impeach-
ment purposes of petitioners' silence, at the time of ar-
rest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." /d. 
at 619. Unlike Doyle, however, the prosecution was not 
permitted to use Miller's postarrest silence for impeach-
ment: 
[T}he trial court in this case did not permit the inquiry 
that Doyle forbids. Instead, the court explicitly sus-
tained an objection to the only question that touched 
upon Miller's postarrest silence. No further questioning 
or argument with respect to Miller's silence occurred, 
and the court specifically advised the jury that it should 
disregard any questions to which an objection was 
sustained. 107 S.Ct. at 3108. 
Thus, there was no Doyle violation because there was no 
improper use of postarrest silence. In addition, the Court 
found no due process violation due to the prosecutor's 
attempt to violate Doyle. "The sequence of events in this 
case- a single question, an immediate objection, and 
two curative instructions- clearly indicates that the 
prosecutor's improper question did not violate Miller's 
due process rights." /d. at 3109. 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
Exclusion from Competency Hearing 
In Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S.Ct. 2658 (1987), the defen-
dant, who was charged with sexual child abuse, was 
excluded from a hearing held to determine the 
competency of two child witnesses. Stincer argued his 
exclusion violated the right of confrontation and due 
process. At the hearing, the children, ages 7 and 8, were 
questioned by the prosecutor and defense counsel, and 
were found to be competent by the trial court. 
On review, the Supreme Court rejected the confronta-
tio_n argument. Two factors influenced the Court:~. de!Ci-
sion. First, the competency hearing had a limited func-
tion. It was intended to determine whether the child is 
capable of observing and recollecting facts, whether the 
child is capable of narrating those facts to the jury, and 
whether the child has a moral sense of the obligation to 
tell the truth. Accordingly, the children were asked back-
ground questions such as their names, where they went 
to school, and how old they were. They were also asked 
whether they knew what a lie is and whether they knew 
what happens when one tells a lie. Thus, the issues 
raised at the hearing were unrelated to the basic issues 
of the trial. 
Second, the primary function of the Confrontation 
Clause is the right of cross-examination. Stincer was 
provided with the opportunity to cros!?-examine both chil-
dren at trial. Some of the same questions that were 
asked at the hearing were again asked at trial. Moreover, 
the defense had the opportunity to ask whatever ques-
tions it wished on the competency issue because that 
issue remained open throughout the trial. In light of 
these two factors, the Court found against Stincer. 
Stincer's due process argument fared no better. The 
Court acknowledged that "a defendant is guaranteed the 
right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceed-
ing that is critical to its outcome if his presence would 
contribute to the fairness of the procedure." /d. at 2667. 
Given the particular nature of the competency hearing, 
however, the Court could find no reason "that his pres-
ence ... would have been useful in ensuring a more 
reliable determination as to whether the witnesses were 
competent to testify." /d. at 2668. 
Bruton - Redacted Confessions 
Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S.Ct. 1702 (1987), was one of 
two cases dealing with Bruton issues. In Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), the Court found a confronta-
tion violation where a nontestifying codefendant's con-
fession, which implicated Bruton, was admitted at a joint 
trial. The Court believed that an instruction limiting 
admissibility to the confessing defendant would be 
ineffective, and thus the jury would use the confession 
against Bruton, who had no opportunity to confront his 
codefendant. One way to avoid a Bruton situation is to 
redact or eliminate any reference about the codefendant. 
The prosecutor followed this procedure in Marsh. 
Marsh was present during a robbery and murder inci-
dent. A witness testified about her conduct during the 
crime, indicating that Marsh, along with two others, was 
an active participant. The confession of her codefendant, 
Williams, was then admitted in evidence. This confession 
was redacted to omit all reference to Marsh. Indeed, it 
omitted all reference to anyone other than Williams and 
Martin, the third alleged accomplice, who was a fugitive 
at the time of the trial. Marsh testified in her own defense. 
She admitted being present at the scene but denied any 
prior knowledge that the crime would occur. Her testimo-
ny, however, placed her in a car with Williams and Martin 
just prior to the crime, and Williams' confession indicated 
that the crime was discussed at that time. The court 
instructed the jury that Williams' confession could be 
considered only when determining Williams' guilt. The 
jury convicted both. Marsh appealed, citing Bruton. 
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The Supreme Court ruled that Bruton did not cover 
Marsh's case. In Bruton the codefendant's confession 
expressly implicated Bruton as the accomplice. In 
contrast, Williams' confession on its face did not impli-
cate Marsh. Marsh was linked to the confession only 
through other evidence admitted at trial, i.e., her own 
testimony. The Court held that "evidentiary linkage" or 
"contextual implication" did not present the potential for 
jury disregard of the limiting instruction that underlie the 
Bruton decision: 
In short, while it may not always be simple for the 
members of a jury to obey the instruction that they 
disregard ancincriminating inference, there does not 
exist the overwhelming probability of their inability to 
do so that is the foundation of Bruton's exception to the 
general rule. 107 S.Ct. at 1708. 
In addition, the Court cited the practical difficulties of 
adopting a different rule. A redacted confession can be 
reviewed prior to trial, but assessing "evidentiary link-
age" prior to trial is often impossible. Moreover, the use 
of separate trials or complete exclusion of the confession 
were alternatives that the Court fouhd unacceptable. 
Bruton - Interlocking Confessions 
Cruz v. New York, 107 S.Ct. 1714 (1987), also involved a 
Bruton issue. In an earlier case, Parker v. Randolph, 442 
U.S. 62 (1979), the Court was unable to resolve authorita-
tively whether Bruton applied to interlocking confessions 
-situations where the defendant's own confession 
corroborates the codefendant's confession. 
Eulogio Cruz was tried along with his brother, Benja-
min, for the death of a gas station attendant. Benjamin's 
confession, which implicated Eulogio, was admitted at 
trial. Since Eulogio had also confessed, the New York 
Court of Appeals affirmed.his conviction. It based its 
decision on Parker, in which a plurality of the Court had 
held Bruton inapplicable to interlocking confessions. The 
plurality reasoned that Bruton applied only when the non-
testifying codefendant's confession was "devastating" to 
the defendant's case, which was not the situation when 
the defendant has himself confessed to essentially the 
same facts. Four Justices disagreed with this reasoning, 
but one found against Parker on harmless error grounds. 
Thus, Parker lost his appeal, even though the Court was 
evenly divided on the issue of interlocking confessions. 
With this background, the Court returned to the issue 
of interlocking confessions in Cruz. This time a majority 
of the Court rejected the reasoning of the Parker plurality 
and found a Bruton violation: 
This case is indistinguishable from Bruton with respect 
to those factors the Court has deemed relevant in this 
area: the likelihood that the instruction will be disre-
garded, ... the probability that such disregard will 
have a devastating effect, ... and the determinability 
of these facts in advance of trial ... 107 S.Ct. at 17·; 9. 
Hearsay 
Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2775 (1987), raise~ 
evidentiary and constitutional issues about the coconspi-
rator exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) 
(2)(E). The evidentiary questions concerned the proce-
dural aspects governing admissibility. First, the Court 
ruled that the trial court in determining the admissibility 
of coconspirator statements must use the "preponder-
ance of evidence" standard of proof. Second, the Court 
held that preliminary proof of the conspiracy as well as 
the defendant's and declarant's participation in the 
$i' conspiracy need not be established by independent 
evidence. In other words, the hearsay statement itself 
may be considered in determining admissibility. Com-
pare Ohio R. Evid. 801(D)(2)(e) (requiring "independent 
proof"). · 
More importantly, the Court ruled that statements fall-
ing within the coconspirator exception automatically 
satisfy confrontation requirements. The Court stated that 
two factors were important in deciding confrontation 
questions in this context: "[T]he Court has, as a general 
matter only, required the prosecution to demonstrate 
both the unavailability of the declarant and the 'indicia of 
reliability' surrounding the out-of-court declaration." /d. 
at 2782. In United States v. lnadi, 106 S.Ct. 1121 (1986), 
the Court addressed the first factor, holding that unavail-
ability need not be established when the prosecution 
offers coconspirator statements. As for the second (relia-
bility) factor, the Court quoted from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 
U.S. 56, 66 (1980), which stated that reliability could be 
presumed in the case of a "firmly rooted hearsay excep-
tion." Tracing the judicial history of the coconspirator 
exception back over a century and a half, the Court found 
the exception "firmly rooted." 
EX POST FACTO LAWS 
Miller v. Florida, 107 S.Ct. 2446 (1987), presented the 
Court with an ex post facto issue. Miller was convicted of 
sexual battery. At the time the crime was committed, 
Florida's sentencing guidelines would have resulted in a 
presumptive sentence of three and one-half to four and 
one-half years imprisonment. Revised guidelines in 
effect at the time of sentencing called for a presumptive 
sentence of five and one-half to seven years imprison-
ment. The trial court used the revised guidelines and 
imposed a seven-year sentence. The Florida Supreme 
Court upheld the sentence because the revised guide-
lines represented a procedural change, which did not 
require the application ofthe ex post facto doctrine. 
The Supreme Court reversed. Article I of the U.S. 
Constitution provides that neither Congress nor any 
State shall pass any "ex post facto Law." In Calder v. Bull, 
3 Dall. 386 (1798), the Court set forth the contours of this 
prohibition: 
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the 
passing of the law, and which was innocent when 
done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every 
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it 
was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the 
punishment, and inflicts greater punishment, than the 
law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every 
law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives 
less, or different testimony, than the law required at the 
time of the commission of the offense, in order to 
convict the offender. /d. at-390 (emphasis omitted). 
~ubsequent cases set out further principles. The law 
must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events 
occurring before its enactment," and the law "must 
disadvantage the offender affected by it." Weaver v. 
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Graham, 450 U.S. 24,29 {1981). In addition, there is no ex 
post facto violation if the change does not alter "substan-
tial personal rights," and mere changes of "modes of 
procedure" do not affect matters of substance. Dobbert v. 
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 {1977). 
Applying these principles, the Court in Miller found the 
use of the revised sentencing guidelines constitutionally 
defective. The guidelines were imposed retrospectively, 
they disadvantaged the defendant by subjecting him to 
the possibility of increased punishment, and they could 
not be characterized as "procedural." 
EXTRADITION 
Richard Smolin was charged with parental kidnapping 
in Louisiana. Louisiana then asked for his extradition 
from California. A California court, however, issued a writ 
of habeas corpus precluding extradition. The court found 
that since Smolin had custody under California custody 
decrees, he was not "substantially charged" with a crime in 
Louisiana. The California Supreme Court upheld the writ. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed in California v. 
Superior Court, 107 S.Ct. 2433 (1987). The Extradition 
Clause is found in Article IV of the Constitution: 
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or 
other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found 
in another State, shall on Demand of the executive 
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered 
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of 
the Crime. · 
This Clause is implemented through the Extradition Act 
of 1793. Under the Act, extradition is a summary proce-
dure. Determining guilt or innocence, or considering the 
availability of defenses, is not appropriate. Such issues 
are to be litigated in the courts of the demanding State. 
Only four issues are properly considered in an extradi-
tion proceeding: 
(a) whether the extradition documents on their face are 
in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged 
with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the 
petitioner is the person named in the request for extra-
dition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive. 
Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978). 
Since these requirements were satisfied, California had 
to extradite. The breadth of the Court's decision is 
captured in the concluding paragraph: 
We are not informed by the record why it is that the 
States of California and Louisiana are so eager to force 
the Smolins halfway across the continent to face crimi-
nal charges that, at least to a majority of the California 
Supreme Court, appear meritless. If the Smolins are 
correct, they are not only innocent of the charges 
against them, but also victims of a possible abuse of 
the criminal process. But, under the Extradition Act, it 
is for the Louisiana courts to do justice in this case, not 
the California courts: "surrender is not to be interfered 
with by the summary process of habeas corpus upon 
speculations as to what ought to be the result of a trial 
in the place where the Constitution provides for its 
taking place." 107 S.Ct. at 2441. 
In a second extradition case, Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 
107 S.Ct. 2802 (1987), the Court overruled Kentucky v. 
Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), and held that a federal 
court can issue a writ of mandamus to cempel the §ever-
nor of a state to perform the mandatory, ministerial duty 
of delivering a fugitive upon proper demand by another 
state. 
RETROACTIVITY 
In Griffin v. Kentucky, 107 S.Ct. 708 (1987), the Court 
announced a new retroactivity rule. Griffin involved the 
retroactive application of Batson v. Kentucky, 106 S.Ct. 
1712 (1986), which the Court decided in the prior Term. 
Batson challenged the prosecution's use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude blacks from a jury. The Court ruled 
that a defendant could establish a prima facie case of 
racial discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment based on the prosecution's use of peremptory 
challenges to strike members of the defendant's race. 
Once the defendant had made the prima facie showing, 
the burden shifted to the prosecution to come forward 
with a neutral explanation for those decisions. In Allen v. 
Hardy, 106 S.Ct. 2878 (1986), the Court had held that 
Baston was not to be applied retroactively to a case on 
federal habeas review. In that case the Court determined 
that Baston "is an explicit and substantial break with 
prior precedent" because it overruled a portion of Swain 
v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
Griffin presented the retroactivity issue as applied to 
litigation pending on direct state or federal review. Under 
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the Court's prior cases, retroactivity in this context was 
determined by a three-pronged analysis: "(a) the 
purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent 
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old 
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of 
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." 
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
The Court in Griffin held that "failure to apply a newly 
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on 
direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adju- · 
dication." 107 S.Ct. at 713. First, the integrity of judicial 
review requires the application of a new rule to all similar 
case-s~penoing~dh"'Clirect review; announcing new, pro-
spective~only rules smacks more of a legislative, rather 
than an adjudicative, function. Second, "selective appli-
cation of new rules violates the principle of treating simi-
larly situated defendants the same." /d. Given these 
principles, the Court refused to continue to recognize a 
"clear break?' exception to retroactivity for cases pending 
on direct review: 
We therefore hold that a new rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to 
all cases, state or federal, ... with no exception for 
cases in which the new rule constitutes a "clear break" 
with the past. /d. at 716. 
